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Today, the question of “Is there a duty to negotiate in good faith?” still arises in most of the 
jurisdictions that practice English Law. This paper reviews the principle of good faith in English 
contract law to provide an insight of how the UK courts make judgment decisions. The main 
reference case to support this research paper is Walford v Miles which had been cited by many 
jurisdictions for their previous court decisions. Other sources of references were derived from 
legal journal articles and books. In the discussion, there were findings both supporting and 
rejecting the “agreement to agree”. However, the final outcome of the analysis revealed that a 
more explicit definition by the UK law is required to end the debate on the principle vagueness.   
 






     In the civilized world as early as the 19
th
 
century, people could engage in commerce 
with minimum restrictions and the law of 
contract under the English legal system also 
allows people to have freedom of contract. 
According to Sir George Jessel in Printing and 
Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson [1] that: 
“If there is one thing more than another which 
public policy requires, it is that men of full age 
and competent understanding shall have the 
utmost liberty in contracting, and that their 
contracts, when entered freely and voluntarily, 
shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by 
the Courts of Justice.” [2]. 
 
     While there is freedom to contract, 
Applebey argues that the underlying legal 
protection of contract law for contracting 
parties among others are reasonableness, 
equality of bargaining power and fairness. He 
stated that “As an antidote to the equitable 
notion of fairness, the common law perceived 
certainty as a key objective of contract law” 
[3]. Nevertheless, contract law is not the main 
source of law for contracting obligations. 
Contract, tort, and restitution exist side by side 
which is often overlaps. 
 
     Lord Roskill also viewed certainty 
importantly. He said: 
“First that law should be certain. Secondly, 
whilst being certain it must be adaptable to the 
changing needs of the particular period. Those 
two principles are not contradictory. On the 
contrary, they are complementary. As to the 
first, business men make their contracts by 
reference to certain legal rules. Those rules 
must be certain.” [4]. 
 
     Applebey further stressed on the importance 
of good faith for contract law which is 
equivalent of equity and reasonableness and 
much more [5]. 
 
What is Good Faith? 
     Good faith in contract law is a very 
subjective legal statement which leads to 
various theoretical definitions. Juenger ever 
quoted, “the term.....lacks a fixed 
meaning.....because [it] is loose and 
amorphous.” [6]. At the same tone, Powers 
described good faith as “an elusive term best 
left to lawyers and judges to define over a 
period of time as circumstances require.” [7]. 
 
     On the other hand, a more serious note on 
good faith by O‟Connor is: 
“A fundamental principle derived from the 
rule pacta sunt servanda, and other legal 
rules, distinctively and directly related to 
honesty, fairness and reasonableness, the 
application of which is determined at a 
particular time by the standards of honesty, 
fairness and reasonableness prevailing in the 
community which are considered appropriate 
                                                                                                                       
for formulation in new or revised legal rules.” 
[8]. 
 
     Good faith is essential for contract law in 
the European civil law systems [9]. It applies 
to United States (US), Canada and many other 
jurisdictions as well. However, it is not 
recognised in the English Common Law.  
 
     Although the concept of good faith already 
existed since the development of Roman Law 
[10], the concept of good faith as an implied 
principle in the performance of contracts being 
adopted later in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries throughout civil law regimes [11] 
particularly in England. The importance of 
good faith concept was then expanded into 
common law whereby in 1766, Lord Mansfield 
refer good faith as “the governing 
principle......applicable to all contracts and 
dealings” [12]. 
 
     Meanwhile in the modern world of civil 
law, Bingham L.J. further commented good 
faith concept as follow: 
“In many civil law systems, and perhaps in 
most legal systems outside the common law 
world, the law of obligations recognises and 
enforces an overriding principle that in 
making and carrying out contracts parties 
should act in good faith. This does not simply 
mean that they should not deceive each other, 
a principle which any legal system must 
recognise; its effect is perhaps most aptly 
conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms 
as „playing fair‟, „coming clean‟ or „putting 
one‟s cards face upwards on the table‟. It is in 
essence a principle of fair and open dealing.” 
[13]. 
 
     Later, in 1989 the Court of Appeal 
supported Bingham L.J‟s decision in Interfoto 
Picture Library v Stilletto Visual Programmes 
[14] that the following three key elements of 
good faith is applicable in protecting the 
contracting parties: 
i. Promotion of fair and open dealing 
ii. Prevention of unfair surprise 
iii. Absence of real choice 
 
     It is a well established principle that 
English Courts will try their best to enforce 
contracts between parties so as to avoid being 
coined as the „destroyer of bargain‟ [15]. 
However, the judges must be able to clarify the 
objectivity and certainty of an agreement at 
least in the eyes of a reasonable man. 
     Good faith is indeed important [16] for 
contract law as what Tetley agreed that the 
application of good faith is priority for contract 
formation and performance and also necessary 
during the enforcement of a contract [17]. 
 
The Walford Case [18]: 
     “The defendants, owners of a company, 
were negotiating for the sale of the company to 
the plaintiffs. On 17 March 1987, they had 
entered into an agreement whereby in return 
for the provision of a comfort letter from the 
plaintiffs‟ bank (indicating that loan facilities 
had been granted to cover the price of £2m), 
the defendants agreed to terminate any 
negotiations with third parties, not to entertain 
offers from any other prospective purchasers 
and to deal exclusively with the plaintiffs. 
Although the plaintiffs complied with their side 
of the agreement, the defendants withdrew 
from the negotiations and decided to sell to 
third party. The plaintiffs claimed damages for 
breach of this collateral agreement, which 
arguably was both a lock-out and lock-in 
agreement. The Court of Appeal held that the 
collateral agreement alleged was only an 
agreement to negotiate and was therefore 
unenforceable. The plaintiffs appealed. Held 
(dismissing the appeal): although lock-out 
agreement (not to negotiate with any other 
person) could be enforceable if it was made for 
good consideration and covered a fixed period 
of time, where, as here, it covered an 
unspecified period of time it was 
unenforceable. There could be no implied term 
to negotiate in good faith for a reasonable 
period of time.”  
There are two legal issues that formed the final 
House of Lord‟s decision that is there were no 
„fixed period‟ and „consideration‟ for 
negotiation in the “lock-out” agreement. 
Walford‟s appeal was dismissed because he 
failed to provide express terms and the 
determined duration to finalise the negotiation.  
 
     Lord Ackner gave a precise comment, “The 
reason why an agreement to negotiate, like an 
agreement to agree, is unenforceable is simply 
because it lacks the necessary certainty” [19] 
Further, Lock Ackner noted: 
 “A duty to negotiate in good faith is as 
unworkable in practice as it is inherently 
inconsistent with the position of a negotiating 
party. It is here that the uncertainty lies. In my 
judgment, while negotiations are in existence 
either party is entitled to withdraw from these 
negotiations, at any time and for any reasons. 
There can thus be no obligation to continue to 
negotiate until there is a ‟proper reason‟ to 
withdraw. Accordingly, a bare agreement to 
negotiate has no legal content.” [20].  
 
                                                                                                                       
     So, what Ackner argued above was that 
there is no solid „consideration‟ to justify the 
continued negotiation especially without 
specific duration to last. When there is no solid 
consideration and fixed duration it makes the 
agreement to negotiate uncertain. In turn, 
uncertainty gives no obligation to any 
contracting parties in an agreement. 
 
     In the Court of Appeal [21] a very clear 
judgment was made by Bingham L.J. that the 
courts would stand firmly not to recognise any 
provision for uncertainty especially for 
commercial practices. He looked at the “lock-
out” agreement between contracting parties is a 
separate undertaking which was not part of the 
process during negotiation to enforce a 
contract. Rather it is only just related 
machinery for conducting the negotiations. 
Therefore, a „lock-out‟ agreement is a negative 
agreement, whereby one contacting party 
promises another party that he or she will not 
negotiate, for a fixed period, with any third 
party. His Lordship commented that:  
“If any obligation by either party to negotiate 
is disregarded as legally ineffective, there 
remains a clear undertaking by Mr. Miles on 
behalf of himself and his wife, conditional on 
timely production of a comfort letter, not to 
deal with any party other than the plaintiffs 
and not to entertain any alternative proposal. 
If this undertaking was supported by 
consideration moving from the plaintiffs as 
promisees and was sufficiently certain to be 
given legal effect, I see no reason why it 
should not form part of a legally enforceable 
contract.” [22].  
 
     Although no time limit was mentioned for 
this “lock-out”, Bingham L.J. opined that there 
were no obstacles for the agreement to remain 
in force for a reasonable time which would end 
if the parties reached “a genuine impasse.”  
Based on the facts, he rejected the defendants‟ 
reasons for terminating the negotiations (which 
were never informed to the plaintiffs) could be 
considered as an impasse bringing the 
plaintiffs' period of exclusivity to an end.  
 
     The rationale is to encourage the 
contracting parties to a duty to negotiate in 
good faith but Bingham L.J. did not see this as 
a challenge “since it is without doubt what the 
parties intended should happen.”[23]. 
Therefore, he was unable to accept the 
„agreement to agree‟ become a valid contract 
to negotiate in good faith. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledged the difficulties inherent in 
enforcing such a contract which he didn‟t rule 
out such a concept were impossible. His 
Lordship continued:  
“If such a contract were recognised, breach 
could not of course be demonstrated merely by 
showing a failure to agree, and if negotiations 
were shown to have broken down it might be 
necessary for the court to decide whether the 
parties had reached a genuine impasse or 
whether one or the other party had for 
whatever ulterior reason aborted the 
negotiation. This could be hard to decide, but 
no harder than other matters which regularly 
fall for judicial decision.” [24]. 
 
     When the House of Lords dismissed the 
appeal [25], it differentiated between a “lock-
in” and “lock-out” agreements that the former 
is an attempt to make one party negotiate 
exclusively with another person whilst is an 
undertaking not to negotiate with a third party 
and under special circumstances, it can be 
enforceable. In other words, a negative “lock-
out” arrangement could be enforceable if it 
expressed with terms and fixed duration of the 
“lock-out” and was supported by 
consideration. However, the parties could 
never be “locked-in” to positive negotiations 
by such a contract as it would generate 
uncertainty and leads to unenforceable contract 
to negotiate. Moreover, there could be no 
implied term to negotiate positively in 
supporting for a reasonable period of time in a 
“lock-out” contract. Lord Ackner strongly 
debated that an „agreement to agree‟ was not 
recognised in English Contract Law. That 
means the contracting parties concerned have 
no obligations to finalise a contract as well as 
to determine when to end the bargaining.  
 
     In addition, he challenged that how could 
the court to police such an „agreement‟? As 
such he rejected outright the possibility of 
good faith being an important principle for 
contract negotiations. His Lordship argued:  
“How can a court be expected to decide 
whether, subjectively, a proper reason existed 
for the termination of negotiations? The 
answer suggested depends upon whether the 
negotiations have been determined „in good 
faith.‟ However, the concept of a duty to carry 
on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the 
parties when involved in negotiations. Each 
party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue 
his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids 
making misrepresentations. To advance that 
interest he must be entitled, if he thinks it 
appropriate, to threaten to withdraw from 
further negotiations or to withdraw in fact in 
the hope that the opposite party may seek to 
reopen the negotiations by offering him 
                                                                                                                       
improved terms A duty to negotiate in good 
faith is as unworkable in practice as it is 
inherently inconsistent with the position of a 
negotiating party.” [26].   
 
     The final judgment from the House of 
Lords is preferable to that of the Court of 
Appeal because the uncertainty of express 
terms and without fixed period in the “lock-
out” agreement. The decision is to protect 
contracting parties in exercising “Bad Faith” 
practices under any ingenuine, unfair, 
unreasonableness negotiation. Thus Walford 
outcome served as a Doctrine of Good Faith in 
English contract law or a precedent case for 
future court reference. 
 
Analysis 
     Obviously, English Contract Law rejected 
“agreement to agree” which is not enforceable. 
It was earlier recognised by Lord Denning in 
Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Bros 
(hotels) Ltd [27]: 
“If the law does not recognise a contract to 
enter into a contract (when there is a 
fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to 
me that it cannot recognise a contract to 
negotiate. The reason is because it is too 
uncertain to have any binding force. It seems 
to me that a contract to negotiate, like a 
contract to enter into a contract, is not a 
contract known to the law.” [28]. 
 
     Hence, Courtney and Walford cases became 
a common law reference. The reason English 
Contract Law doesn‟t accept „Duty to 
Negotiate in Good Faith‟ directly mainly due 
to the fundamental principle of certainty. 
Certainty is the main requirement for contract 
formation as depicted in Loftus v Robert [29]. 
Furthermore, the agreement to negotiate also 
contradicts to the freedom to contract. 
 
     However, many judges didn‟t reject „Duty 
to Negotiate in Good Faith‟ entirely. For 
instance Lord Denning commented a contract 
is unenforceable only when it lacks both 
certainty and incompleteness. A similar “lock-
out” agreement justified with “Certainty” is in 
Pitt v PHH Asset Management Ltd [30].  On 
the other hand, Lord Ackner did support duty 
of good faith when “use of best endeavours” in 
Channel Home Centers, Division of Grace 
Retail Corp. V Grossman [31].  
 
     Another recent case which support to the 
above arguments is in Petromec v Petroleo 
Brasileiro SA Petrobas [32]. The Court of 
Appeal claimed that the agreement was legally 
enforceable and held that the express 
obligation to negotiate the additional costs in 
good faith was not a bare agreement to 
negotiate. Lord Justice Longmore said:  
“It would be a strong thing to declare 
unenforceable a clause into which the parties 
have deliberately and expressly entered” [33]. 
 
     Although the decision made by Longmore 
LJJ in the Petromec case is non-binding, many 
researchers argued in favour of the need for 
such a flexibility enforceable „express‟ 
obligation to negotiate in good faith as long as 
there is a detail written contract produced by 
professional lawyers. 
 
     For instance, Friedman and Wilcox 
commented: 
“....is an interesting case because, contrary to 
the traditional view, it suggests that there are 
certain situations where an agreement to 
negotiate in good faith may be enforceable” 
[34]. 
 
     They further suggested that the rule of good 
faith should be adopted by the courts in order 
to provide clearer stance between the 
contracting parties for binding a negotiation 
[35].  
 
     Notwithstanding to the above, the 
challenges of the principle of good faith can be 
further cross examined in other jurisdictions. 
 The Australian Law shares the same English 
Common Law heritage but is moving towards 
the European and United States approach more 
recently [36]. In 1991, an interesting debate 
was found in Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd. v 
Sijehama Pty Ltd [37]. Despite the final 
decision was in line with Walford case 
judgment but there were contradict views on 
the principle of good faith by three different 
judges. Both Kirby P and Waddell A-JA 
agreed that it was possible that an agreement to 
negotiate may be enforceable in certain 
circumstances whilst Handley A-JA, claimed 
the opposite is true which he noted, “a promise 
to negotiate in good faith is illusory and 
therefore cannot be binding” [38]. 
 
     Meanwhile in US, although the American 
law recognize good faith but it is not fall under 
the common law instead is found in statute 
under sect. 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC). It stated that “[e]very contract 
or duty within this Act imposes an obligation 
of good faith in its performance of 
enforcement.” [39]. However, Coyne and 
Evans said that not all the US 50 states 
jurisdictions are adopting this statute for their 
practice [40]. 
                                                                                                                       
 
     Based on the above jurisdictions 
comparison, it is claimed that there were 
inconsistency found in various court decisions 
when interpreting the principle of good faith 
under English Law. Nevertheless, it is part of 
the English Contract Law where piecemeal 
solution is applied for different circumstances. 
In Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto 
Visual Progammes Ltd [41]. Bingham L.J. 
observed: 
“English Law has, characteristically, 
committed itself to no such overriding 
principle but has developed piecemeal 
solutions in response to demonstrated 
problems of unfairness. Many examples could 
be given. Thus equity has intervened to strike 
down unconscionable bargains. Parliament 
has stepped in to regulate the imposition of 
exemption clauses and the form of certain hire-
purchase agreements. The common law also 
has made its contribution by holding that 
certain classes of contract require the utmost 
good faith, by treating as irrecoverable what 
purport to be agreed estimates of damage but 
are in truth a disguised penalty for breach, and 
in many other ways.” [42]. 
 
     In addition Bradgate R. commented,  
“Among the many other “piecemeal solutions” 
which English courts have used to police the 
fairness of contracts and their performance, in 
the absence of a general good faith doctrine, 
are the common law rules on mistake and 
misrepresentation, duress (including economic 
duress) and undue influence, the objective 
interpretation of contracts, the concept of 
unconscionability, implied terms, waiver and 
estoppels.” [43].  
 
     Applebey also strongly advocate that 
“English Contract Law already has good faith 
by applying notions in other ways or using 
other doctrines.”[44]. This has been proven in 
Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v. Blackpool 
Borough Council [45] and Fairclough Building 
Ltd v. Port Talbot Borough Council [46]. 
 
     In short, the principle of good faith is a 
subjective statement which evens a legally 
defined Act like in Australia still encounters 
difficulty to interpret it consistently. So far, 
there is no specific concept of the good faith 
that can be defined both by the courts and 
scholars [47].   
     Perhaps, Cooter and Schafer have a better 
idea to handle the issue: 
“In fact, the civil codes of contracts are not 
inherently formal or informal, or flexible or 
inflexible. Civil codes contain precise rule and 
also general rules. By stressing precise rules, 
courts can decide cases informally and 
inflexibly. By stressing general rules like good 
faith, courts can decide cases informally and 
flexibly.” [48].  
 
Conclusion 
     Clearly, the current position of the English 
Law still does not recognize the principle of 
good faith. Thus no implied duty will be 
construed for any contracting party to 
negotiate. However, where the term is 
expressly drafted by professional lawyers 
which includes the liabilities of breaching the 
term, the duty to negotiate in good faith is then 
will be binding. This resulted vagueness in the 
English Law whenever interpreting of this rule 
as compare to other jurisdictions throughout 
the world which already adopted it. The 
situation had been commented by McKendrick 
as follow: 
“While the objection based on the uncertainty 
of an obligation to negotiate in good faith can 
be applied to express and implied terms, it can 
be said to carry less weight in the context of an 
expressly assumed obligation to negotiate in 
good faith because it is trumped by the 
argument based on freedom of contract” [49]. 
 
     However, if the underlying challenges of 
the „implied‟ term are clearly defined the 
judges will be able to give validity to an 
agreement more easily. Hence, in line with the 
EC Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulation 1999 [50] the English courts should 
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